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 Abstract 
The regulatory overhaul of the global OTC derivatives markets, originating from the G20, is 
transforming what used to be a relatively harmonised private and transnational legal regime into a 
public regulatory space fragmented by diverse territorial jurisdictions. In this regulatory space 
jurisdictional borders are elusive. Especially the United States and the European Union are applying 
what seems to be a novel type of regulatory strategy designed to protect their market share and curb 
regulatory arbitrage. The strategy, dubbed here the Regulate Thy Neighbour strategy, builds on 
unilateralist application of extraterritoriality, forms of direct and indirect protectionism, and 
conditional deference. Deference strategies such as the US substituted compliance and the EU 
equivalence regime should be regarded as carrots, applied together with the sticks of extraterritoriality 
and protectionism to drive regulatory convergence towards the strongest. However, the EU and US 
have failed to fill the leadership void in the global financial governance system, which remains soft at 
its core, and instead locked themselves in a regulatory turf war which has prevented them from 
recognising each other’s regulatory frameworks or finalising their own. Meanwhile, looming risks of 
costly regulatory retaliation are increasing market fragmentation and deglobalisation. The emerging 
“titanic model” of systemic risk management, where risk is concentrated in presumably watertight 
national compartments rather than mutualised globally, is not the way towards a more stable global 
financial system. In the short term, a successful completion of the transatlantic partnership is needed in 
order to reach the derivative reform’s ultimate goals and to counter financial fragmentation. But 
acknowledging the many practical and political problems involved in the exportation of rules through 
the Regulate Thy Neighbour strategy, which can also be manifested in a bilateral form, this paper joins 
the increasing number of scholars calling for more global and multilateral forms of financial 
governance. 
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 1 
Introduction1 
Set in motion by the Group of twenty (G20) 2009 summit in Pittsburgh, the governance of the global 
market for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives is undergoing a metamorphosis. The reform 
programme targets various fundamental elements of OTC derivatives contracts with a view to better 
managing systemic risks and enhancing transparency and financial stability. The key reforms include 
1) mandatory clearing of standardised derivatives in so-called central counterparties (CCPs), 2) the 
execution of adequately liquid contracts on transparent and organised trading venues, 3) the reporting 
of trades to special trade repositories, and 4) subjecting non-cleared bilateral derivatives to regulatory 
capital and margin requirements. 
The reform was triggered by the findings about how OTC derivatives, in particular credit default 
swaps (CDS), contributed to the Global Financial Crisis.
2
 The process means a sea change for a 
market that used to be subject to little public rules but operated instead under a system of 
sophisticated, transnational self-regulation. The sheer size of the market, valued notionally at USD 553 
trillion at the end-June 2015
3
, would make a good case for getting the rules right. But the instalment of 
the new system has gone anything but smoothly especially where majority of the trading in derivatives 
takes place, that is, in the United States and Europe. In many important respects the final rules are yet 
to be agreed upon, or their full force postponed. In Europe, they key legislation European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)
4
 entered into force already in August 2012, but the market is still 
operating under a transitional regime. 
A big factor behind the implementation problems is the lack of supporting changes in the global 
governance architecture for financial markets where soft law dominates. The fundamental problem 
remains: “how to regulate cross-border business activity in a system that defines regulatory 
sovereignty as territorial prerogative”.5 Because of this, the result has been a shift from a relatively 
harmonised private regime to a public regulatory space fragmented by diverse territorial jurisdictions. 
Consequently, regulators face a formidable task of coordinating their rulemaking procedures with their 
foreign colleagues whose legislative mandates, reform calendars, priorities, and even incentives are 
often different from their own.
6
 
                                                     
1
 Earlier versions of this working paper have been presented in the ERC-ERPL Workshop “The Transformation of Private 
Law – 4th Meeting of the Project Advisory Board” (Florence, 18 June 2015) and in the kick-off Workshop of the 
External Dimension of European Private Law Project, funded by the Academy on Finland (Florence, 28 January 2016).  I 
wish to thank all the participants and commentators for their insightful feedback. I am also indebted to Emilios 
Avgouleas, John C. Coffee, and Hans Micklitz for their helpful comments. 
2
 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Report (The FCIC Report), p. 50-51. 
3
 See Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review, June 2015, p. 24-25. The number and value of outstanding 
positions has been in significant decline, which according to BIS is due to advances made in new trade compression 
technologies helping to eliminate “redundant” contracts. It should also be noted that the gross market value of all reported 
derivatives contracts is significantly smaller. Furthermore, if legally enforceable bilateral netting agreements are taken 
into account, the number is significantly smaller still. 
4
 Regulation (EC) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties 
(CCPs) and trade repositories (TRs). 
5
 Hannah L. Buxbaum, “Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance.” 42 Va. J. Int'l L. (2001): p. 931, 933. 
On the prevalence of territoriality as a central element in international financial law, see C. Brummer. “Territoriality as a 
Regulatory Technique: Notes from the Financial Crisis.” University of Cincinnati Law Review 79 (2010): p. 11-16.  
6
 The following note from a commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is revealing: “[…] at no 
time in the Commission’s [SEC] history have we been more engaged with the international community or more involved 
in collaborative work streams with our fellow regulators from around the globe. Much of this international work stems 
from the 2009 G20 initiatives regarding over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives reforms.” Michael S. Piwowar, Toward a 
Global Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border OTC Derivatives Activities, the Harvard Law School Forum on 
Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (March 22, 2014). 
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The nature of the new rules exacerbates coordination difficulties. Rules such as capital adequacy 
requirements are entity-specific, but many derivatives rules apply instead to the transactions 
themselves. The concentration rules, which force standardised contracts into centralised clearing and 
on organised trading venues, are good examples of such transaction-level rules. Such rules capture, by 
default, both sides of the contract. For instance, when the EU mandates that all interest rate derivative 
contracts must be cleared in an authorised clearinghouse, this rule captures also all the non-EU 
counterparties to such contracts. On a market in which the parties to contracts are more often than not 
situated in different jurisdictions this introduces clear compliance problems. For instance, in 2012 
around 80 per cent of credit derivative transactions had a cross-border element.
7
 At the time Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy it had hundreds of thousands of contracts outstanding with around 8,000 
different counterparties around the globe.
8
  The question of whose rules to comply with is made all the 
more difficult by the fact that many rules have been given extraterritorial effects which means that 
they can capture trades which have a weak connection, if any, to the rule-issuing jurisdiction. In such a 
system jurisdictional conflicts are omnipresent. 
As the term “cross-border regulatory space” in the title of this paper suggests, the global derivatives 
reforms are creating a regulatory space in which jurisdictional borders are increasingly elusive. In fact, 
also in cross-border dialogues the pervasive cross-border coordination problems have been labelled as 
“joint jurisdiction” issues.9 Reports such as “EU and US aim for May deal on derivatives clearing”10 
or “Europe and US fail to agree on derivatives rules”11 reflect well the fact like all shared regulatory 
spaces, the cross-border regulatory space for OTC derivatives is highly contested.
12
 
This paper sheds some light on the source and nature of the implementation and coordination 
problems overshadowing the OTC derivatives reform. The Transatlantic derivatives dispute provides a 
useful laboratory for the analysis of a more general problem to which the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) now habitually refers to as “Cross-Border Regulatory Issues”. To understand the problems, one 
needs first to understand the markets and how the new rules are affecting them. For that reason, the 
next section will shortly introduce financial derivatives and the regulatory reforms aimed at the OTC 
derivatives market. 
Second, the paper assesses the present regulatory strategies available for addressing jurisdictional 
conflicts and disputes between regulators, as well as for exerting influence towards weaker countries. 
The dominant regulatory strategy, which is dubbed here the Regulate Thy Neighbour strategy, builds 
on unilateralist application of extraterritoriality, various forms of direct and indirect protectionism, and 
conditional deference. In the EU the so called “equivalence regime” allows for the possibility to 
disapply EU rules in favour of the rules of another jurisdiction whose regulatory and supervisory 
regime has been considered adequately equivalent. In the United States “substituted compliance” 
framework similarly makes possible deference to another jurisdiction’s rules. Such deference 
strategies should be seen are carrots, which are applied together with the sticks of extraterritoriality 
and protectionism to drive regulatory convergence towards the strongest. 
                                                     
7
 See M. Barnier, International cooperation: a sine qua non for the success of OTC derivatives markets reforms, in OTC 
Derivatives: New Rules, New Actors, New Risks, Banque de France, Financial Stability Review, No. 17, April 2013. The 
SEC recently estimated that in 2011 approximately 7 per cent of the U.S. single-name CDS transactions were entered into 
between counterparties domiciled in the U.S. SEC, proposed rule, p. 28-29. 
8
 Hull, John C., Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives (Pearson Education India, 2006), p. 3. 
9
 See the “Path Forward” agreement announced by European Commissioner Michel Barnier and United States Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chairman Gary Gensler. 
10
 The Financial Times, April 24, 2015 
11
 The Financial Times, May 7, 2015 
12
 See Hancher, Leigh, and Michael Moran. “Organizing regulatory space.” In Baldwin, Robert, Colin Scott, and Christopher 
Hood (Eds.) A reader on regulation. (Oxford University Press, 1998), 153-154. 
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What drives the Regulate Thy Neighbour policies is the fear of regulatory arbitrage, an art of 
optimizing the costs of regulation via allocation of financial activities in different jurisdictions. 
Regulatory arbitrage is a contentious policy issue, as it can negatively impact not only the reaching of 
the reforms’ ultimate policy objectives, but also jobs and market share. This has set the EU and US on 
crash course and resulted in a “transatlantic regulatory turf war”.13 The “looming cross-Atlantic 
derivatives trade war” and the forms of “new 21st century protectionism”14 stand as good evidence of 
the shortcomings of the horizontal network model of global financial governance. Like its historical 
precursor Beggar Thy Neighbour, the Regulate Thy Neighbour strategies adversely affect cross-border 
trade, this time in financial instruments and services. The market response has been gradual but 
dramatic in magnitude. Once a very global market now faces a real risk of fragmentation and 
disintegration. Reports have witnessed a significant drop in international trading activity.
15
 
Adopting a pragmatic stance, the paper argues that in the short term a successful completion of the 
transatlantic partnership is needed in order to reach the reform’s ultimate goals.16 The transatlantic 
partnership can revive the transgovernmentalist idea of exporting rules to “weaker states” without 
hierarchy.
17
 This might mitigate the crucial regulatory arbitrage problems without the need to retreat to 
protectionism and continued financial fragmentation. However, the Regulate Thy Neighbour strategy, 
which can also work in through a bilateral alliance or “trade block” has various problems, both 
practical and political. Therefore, the paper also argues for gradual abandonment of the Regulate Thy 
Neighbour approach and for the simultaneous building of a regime based on embryonic forms of 
mutual recognition. As a first step, the key risk management standards agreed on supra-state level 
need to be served in a binding form. The Financial Stability Board as an increasingly important 
umbrella organisation and its member organisations such as IOSCO need to be upgraded and 
empowered in order to foster cooperation and coordination beyond the Atlantic. 
The creation of cross-border regulatory space for OTC derivatives transactions  
Short introduction to financial derivatives 
Derivatives are financial instruments whose value depends on the performance and price of a reference 
asset, rate or index or some other underlying variable.
18
 Derivatives can offer end-users protection 
against market and/or credit risks. Hedging reduces risks through contracting away exposures to 
negative price movements or events (such as rise of fuel prices, or debtor’s default). Derivatives are 
also used for speculation or arbitrage. Speculation basically involves taking a position in the market 
and thus, unlike hedging, also includes the possibly limitless upside. Arbitrageurs differ from both 
                                                     
13
 See Stafford, Europe calls on US to recognise overseas clearing rules, The Financial Times, June 28, 2014.  
14
 J Christopher Giancarlo, Commissioner of the CFTC, Keynote Address at The Global Forum for Derivatives Markets, 35th 
Annual Burgenstock Conference, Geneva, Switzerland (24 September 2014). 
15
 Artamonov, Alexey. “Cross-border application of OTC derivatives rules: revisiting the substituted compliance approach.” 
Journal of Financial Regulation 1.2 (2015): 206-225. 
16
 See also the Danger of Divergence: Transatlantic Financial Reform and the G20 Agenda”, The Atlantic Council report 
(Rapporteur C. Brummer) (December 2013), 7. 
17
 See Kal Raustiala, “The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law”, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2002). 
18
 The underlying can in principle be ”anything that interests markets”, such as stocks and bonds, commodities, interest rates, 
currency rates, stock market indices, and credit quality. Feder, Norman Menachem. “Deconstructing Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives." Colum. Bus. L. Rev. (2002): 677, 681. For various definitions of derivatives, see Partnoy, Frank. "Financial 
derivatives and the costs of regulatory arbitrage." J. Corp. L. 22 (1996): 211. 
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hedgers and speculators in that they seek riskless profits by identifying and exploiting opportunities, 
usually short-lived, created by price differentials or disparities between two or more markets.
19
 
Options and forwards provide the ancestral building blocks of practically all derivatives.
20
 A forward 
is simply “an agreement to buy or sell an asset at a certain future time for a certain price”, whereas an 
option holder has the right, but not the obligation, to buy (call option) or sell (put option) the 
underlying asset at a certain future time.
21
 Another basic derivatives contract is a future, a standardized 
contract traded on-exchange. Swaps are forward-based OTC contracts that have usually been traded 
bilaterally, i.e. off-exchange. Parties to swap contracts basically agree to exchange different sequences 
of cash flows.
22
 For example, a standard (“plain vanilla”) interest rate swap exchanges fixed interest 
cash flows to floating interest cash flows. Credit Default Swaps (CDS) offer protection against loan 
default. Swaps dominate the OTC market: based on their overwhelming success, swaps have been 
considered as “one of the most successful innovations in financial markets ever”.23 At the most 
complex end, derivatives can themselves act as the underlying asset, which is often the case in 
structured or securitized financial products combining a security (usually fixed income bonds) with 
one or more underlying assets (often derivatives).
24
 
The structure of the market for financial derivatives is primarily shaped by the following three factors. 
These distinctions, though somewhat simplified, are important for grasping the on-going regulatory 
reforms and the policy objectives sought after: 
1. The place of execution of the contract: all derivatives are either traded “over-the-counter” 
(OTC derivatives) or through regulated exchanges (exchange-traded derivatives). OTC 
derivatives dominate the global derivatives market: In June 2013, only 9 per cent of all 
derivatives where traded on exchange.
25
 The exchanges offer a limited number of products, 
which are typically made of inflexible terms and conditions set by the exchanges themselves. 
Therefore, the pace of innovation is higher in the OTC market where contracts can be 
customized. Unlike most OTC derivatives, exchange-traded derivatives are transferable, i.e. 
there is a secondary market providing continuous maturity. OTC contracts can have maturities 
ranging from months to years and even decades. For instance, in end-2015 almost a quarter of 
interest rate derivatives had maturities of more than 5 years.
26
 
2. Clearing, or the use of central counterparty: derivatives cleared through a central counterparty 
(CCP) are distinguished from those executed bilaterally or through some alternative contractual 
arrangement; CCPs are a special type of clearinghouse which sit in between the derivatives 
deals, taking a position of a buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer.  Centralized 
clearing effectively mitigates both payment and delivery risks.27 All exchange-traded 
                                                     
19
 See Hull, op.cit, 10-16. 
20
 See e.g. Awrey, Dan. “The dynamics of OTC derivatives regulation: bridging the public-private divide.” European 
Business Organization Law Review 11.02 (2010): 155-193. 
21
 Hull, op. cit., 5, 7-8. 
22
 See Hu, Henry TC. “Misunderstood derivatives: the causes of informational failure and the promise of regulatory 
incrementalism.” Yale Law Journal (1993): 1457-1513, 1467; Feder, op.cit., 701. 
23
 Hull, op.cit., 733. 
24
 Yen, Jerome, and Kin Keung Lai. Emerging Financial Derivatives: Understanding exotic options and structured products. 
Routledge, 2014, 2-3. They lists the following “assets” that can be linked to the product: security, interest rate, currency, 
index, basket of assets (currencies, securities, commodities etc.), commodities, credit quality, volatility, spread, the 
consumer price index and other macroeconomic indicators, property price index. Ibid., 5. 
25
 Deutsche Börse, How Central Counterparties Strengthen the Safety and Integrity of Financial Markets, July 2014, 7 
26
 See BIS, Semiannual OTC derivatives statistics, Table D9 (updated 6 December 2015). 
27
 See Griffith, Sean J. "Substituted compliance and systemic risk: How to make a global market in derivatives regulation." 
Minn. L. Rev. 98 (2013): 1291, 1312. 
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derivatives are centrally cleared, but not all centrally cleared derivatives are traded on 
exchanges. 
3. Level of standardization: another important difference is that between standardized derivatives 
and non-standardized derivatives. All non-standardized, bilaterally negotiated derivative 
contracts are OTC derivatives. They comprise “myriad privately negotiated transactions” which 
can be infinitely tailored.
28
 Standardisation of contractual terms and certain operational 
processes is the key requirement for any OTC derivative to be eligible for CCP clearing. In 
addition, there must exist an adequately liquid market with pricing sources that are fair, reliable 
and generally accepted.
29
 For various reasons, many standardized derivatives have not been 
cleared through a CCP. 
 
The ISDA summarizes the differences between different classes of derivatives in the following way: 
Table 1: Distinctions between OTC, cleared, and listed derivatives 
OTC Cleared Exchange-traded 
Negotiated over-the-counter Negotiated over-the-counter Executed on organized exchanges 
Traded between dealers as 
principals 
Only standardized contracts Only standardized contracts 
Dealer normally counterparty to 
all trades 
All trades booked with 
clearinghouse (counterparty 
to all trades) 
All trades booked with 
exchange’s clearinghouse 
(counterparty to all trades) 
Margin (collateral) often 
exchanged but subject to 
negotiation between 
counterparties 
Mandatory margin 
requirements 
 
Mandatory margin requirements 
 
 
Customized contracts broken 
down by trading desk into 
tradable risks and hedged in 
liquid markets 
Daily settlement (mark to 
market) and margin calls 
Daily settlement (mark to market) 
and margin calls 
Based on: ISDA, Product descriptions and FAQs (http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html) 
Uncleared and non-exchange traded OTC derivatives were at the centre of the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis and thus they have been the focus of policy and regulatory action as well. 
 
                                                     
28
 Feder, op.cit., 678. 
29
 See Financial Stability Board, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, report, 25 October 2010,   
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Regulation of OTC derivatives before the crisis 
The problem with OTC derivatives is that they offer effective tools also for regulatory arbitrageurs, 
meaning that they can be used to exploit differences and disparities in different jurisdictions as well – 
by definition for “riskless” profits.30 Second, they allow virtually endless leveraging and can 
accumulate and concentrate credit risks in the opaque corners of the global financial market. Third, 
little data has been available about the OTC market. 
The AIG bailout proved just how dangerously these aspects could be combined. The AIG built up 
massive exposure on the OTC derivatives market through its London-based subsidiary AIG Financial 
Products (AIGFP). The primary business of AIGFP was selling protection against mortgage defaults 
by way of CDS contracts. Because of its solid credit rating (the CDS contracts were guaranteed by the 
parent company) AIGFP was able to do so hardly committing up-front capital (called “initial 
margin”). This was, and still is, the established market practice. When things started to unravel 
(Lehman not the least) and the infamous collateral calls amassed, the implosion of AIG and with it the 
entire apex of the financial system was quickly a matter of days. Ultimately, the rescue operation cost 
about 180 USD billion in taxpayer funds. The AIG story could be examined as an example of bad risk 
management practices - had there been any.
31
 
OTC derivatives have traditionally been subject to minimal state intervention and light supervision. 
Despite the size and exponential growth of the OTC market, the regulatory framework for financial 
derivatives has remained piecemeal or non-existent.
32
 The firms that use or deal with OTC derivatives 
have been subject to various rules (e.g. capital rules) but the instruments themselves have managed for 
long to avoid fundamental regulatory scrutiny.
33
 In the US, the deregulation movement gained 
momentum especially during the 1990s, culminating in the passing of the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (CFMA) in 2000.
34
 
It is true that the common conception of OTC derivatives markets as essentially “unregulated” 
neglects the extensive self-regulation by what has been called “transnational private regulators”.35 The 
materials, terms, and standards offered by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
provide the dominant contractual framework for OTC transactions. Since the 1980s, the ISDA has 
                                                     
30
 See Partnoy, Frank. “Financial derivatives and the costs of regulatory arbitrage.” J. Corp. L. 22 (1996): 211. (“My point is 
not that derivatives use necessarily results in some harm to society; rather, it is that because derivatives often are used to 
reduce or avoid the costs of financial regulation, the question of whether increased derivatives use is "good" or "bad" 
depends on the particular use.”) 
31
 For a detailed plot of the entire AIG debacle, see The FCIC Report, p. 344- et seq. 
32
 Partnoy, Frank. “The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation.” U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 22 (2001): 421, 429-
426). (also noting that many unregulated derivatives are created for the purpose of avoiding regulations. Ibid., 423, 432-
434). 
33
 Awrey, op.cit., 162. For a detailed account of deregulation of swaps in the U.S., as lead by the CFTC, see Partnoy, op.cit., 
435-442 (describing how the OTC dealers successfully lobbied extensive exemptions in the turn of the 1990s). 
Rauterberg and Verstein describe the CFMA (enacted in 2000) as “the legislation that created almost two decades of de 
facto exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the OTC derivatives market for ISDA”. Rauterberg, Gabriel, and Andrew 
Verstein. “Assessing Transnational Private Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future 
of Financial Reform.” Va. J. Int'l L. 54 (2013), 28. 
34
 FCIC report, p. 48 (“The CFMA effectively shielded OTC derivatives from virtually all regulation or oversight.”) 
35
 Rauterberg and Verstein, op.cit., 9 (“Hundreds of trillions of dollars of OTC derivatives are governed by documents 
written by a single organization, the ISDA, and derive their payments from a single rate governed by another, the BBA” 
Ibid., 13); Nystedt, Jens. “Derivative market competition: OTC markets versus organized derivative exchanges.”, IMF 
Working Paper WP/04/61, April 2004, 4. 
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developed the documentation hand in hand with market development and innovation.
36
 The primary 
purpose of the ISDA Master Agreement is to provide boilerplate terms for non-economic issues 
(default events, governing law and jurisdiction, etc.) while leaving the determination of key economic 
provisions for the parties themselves (terms on interest rate, maturity, collateral etc.).
37
 Given the 
overwhelming success of the market and its private law underpinnings, it is not surprising that OTC 
derivatives have offered a particularly fertile ground for theories of transnational law.
38
 
Despite OTC derivatives, primarily CDS contracts, are high on the list of culprits that caused the 
Global Financial Crisis, derivatives also offer advantages in the form of risk management (hedging) 
and transaction costs. Thus their regulation has been a controversial issue for decades. A prominent 
issue has been the disparity between regulated, exchange-traded derivatives on one hand, and 
unregulated (or self-regulated) over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives on the other.  A sensible public 
policy goal has for long been to level the playing field by either deregulating exchange-traded 
derivatives or regulating OTC derivatives.
39
 Twenty years ago the deregulation argument seemed 
sensible for many.
40
 But with the experience of the Global Financial Crisis, the exact opposite is being 
done as the regulatory space is being expanded to cover the entire market.
41
  
Creating the regulatory space for OTC derivatives 
The on-going reforms, originating from G20, seek to mitigate systemic risk and improve market 
transparency.
42
 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) acting under the auspices of G20 has been tasked 
to coordinate the reforms between national legislators and regulators as well as international standard 
setting bodies such as International Organization for Securities Committees (IOSCO) and Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). In the European Union, most of the G20 commitments 
concerning derivatives are implemented in the EMIR and Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation 
(MiFIR). The EMIR sets a mandatory clearing obligation for those classes of standardised OTC 
derivative contracts, which have been declared subject to clearing obligation (Articles 4 and 5 of 
EMIR). Furthermore, the MiFIR lays down a trading obligation requiring that all sufficiently liquid 
                                                     
36
 Feder, op. cit., 741. The ISDA employs ample expertise to track changes in market practice and to update its 
documentation. See Rauterberg, Verstein, op.cit. 21; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, “Contract as Statute”, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1129, 1144 (2006). 
37
 Choi,  and Gulati, op. cit., 1129-1173, 1140. 
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Law Studies, 13:2, 319-359 
40
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Comparative Institution Approach” J. Corp. L. 21 (1995): 111. 
41
 Here the term regulatory space is used in a way that excludes private ordering. In short, regulatory space is taken as an 
analytical construct defined “by the range of regulatory issues subject to public decision”. Hancher and Moran, op. cit., 
153 (emphasis added). 
42
 Group of 20, Declaration, Pittsburgh summit, September 2009. In particular, the G20 leaders declared that “all 
standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, 
and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade 
repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements.” 
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and cleared OTC derivatives must be traded on trading venues.
43
 For the private part of the market, 
those OTC derivatives that remain uncleared are subjected to capital and collateral requirements as 
well as to various risk mitigation obligations in order to better measure, monitor and mitigate 
operational risk and counterparty credit risk (Art. 11 of EMIR). Also, all derivative contracts must be 
reported to a registered or recognized trade repository (Art. 9 of EMIR). Titles III to V of EMIR lay 
down an extensive and detailed regime for CCPs, including a system for recognising third-country 
CCPs. Titles VI and VII do the same for Trade Repositories. 
To illustrate the reach and practical effects of the new rules, let us take a closer look at rules 
concerning collateral and margin. The level and form of accepted collateral required from the buyer of 
a derivative has traditionally been set by the exchanges and clearinghouses or, in the case of uncleared 
and non-exchange traded derivatives, by the parties to the contracts themselves. In the first case, the 
exchanges and clearinghouses act as centralized sources for minimum margining terms.
44
 The CCPs 
require margins from their clearing members, who must also make contributions to special default 
funds. Margins comprise a fixed component, “initial margin”, that is paid up front and a  “variation 
margin” reflecting changes in the value of open positions.45 Nowadays CCPs are heavily regulated, 
including their praised margining systems. One of the reasons for regulatory intervention is that while 
the regulatory push for standardization of OTC derivatives and the mandatory offloading of such 
contracts to the perceived safety of centralised clearing creates a lot of new business for CCPs, the 
competitive environment could also start pressuring CCPs to lower their risk management 
requirements. The European regulator has expressed the concern in clear terms: “CCPs should not 
reduce their margins to a level that compromises their safety as a result of the existence of a highly 
competitive environment”.46  
In the case of uncleared OTC derivatives, an industry association (ISDA) continues to offer the 
standard contractual framework for the transaction, leaving the ultimate economic choices to the 
parties themselves. This system has been prone to systematic undercollateralization.
47
 Recall that the 
triple-A rating of the AIG made its counterparties feel secure enough to not require collateral up front. 
A logical regulatory countermeasure was therefore the introduction of mandatory collateralisation for 
such non-standardized OTC contracts. This means that legislators and regulatory agencies, in liaison 
with global standard setter organisations, will in the future determine both the eligible forms and 
minimum level of margins for bilateral, privately negotiated OTC derivatives. More stringent 
margining requirements aim at reducing systemic risk, but also set incentives for moving OTC 
derivatives towards centralised clearing.
48
 
The rationale of the policy initiatives is straightforward. In contrast to the OTC markets, derivatives 
clearinghouses were able to navigate through the financial crisis relatively unharmed and, most 
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 See Singh, “Collateral, netting and systemic risk in the OTC Derivatives Market” IMF Working Paper 10/99; Singh and 
Aitken, “Counterparty risk, impact on collateral flows and role for central counterparties”, IMF Working Paper 09/173, 
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importantly, meet their obligations without taxpayer support.
49
 A reformed derivatives market with 
more centrally cleared derivatives is expected to prove more resilient in the next crisis. The reforms 
are biting: The FSB reports a clear general trend towards increased clearing.
50
 Majority of OTC 
derivatives are already cleared through CCPs (60 per cent already in 2013
51
) and more is expected to 
follow after the new regulations enter into force. Progress has been made especially in the market for 
interest rate derivatives
52
 but also more credit default swaps are finding CCPs.
53
 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that all privately negotiated OTC derivatives will 
eventually be cleared through CCPs, let alone traded on exchanges. The OTC market segment will be 
smaller and subject to more regulation, but substantial portion of the market will remain uncleared.
54
 
Moreover, strict separation between OTC and exchange-based derivative markets has always been 
somewhat misleading, as the markets are in part complementary and in constant competition with each 
other.
55
 The regulatory push towards centralized clearing has not terminated the competition between 
public and private derivatives markets: the flexibility and lighter cost structure of the OTC market can 
still trump the safety of exchange-based trading.
56
 The OTC market will remain the primary source of 
innovation in the market for derivatives. 
Implementation between soft multilateralism and hard unilateralism 
Divergence, gaps, overlaps, and arbitrage  
Much of the consensus that has been reached under the G20 umbrella has been lost in implementation, 
where soft principles and policy goals have been translated into hard rules. The global regulatory 
response has given rise to an uneven playing field characterized by conflicts, inconsistencies, overlaps 
and gaps.
57
 The FSB’s recent progress report summarises the prevailing cross-border concerns in the 
following way: 
“Several authorities also note that unevenness in the pace of implementation of reforms, as well as 
inconsistencies or gaps in the application of requirements to cross-border transactions, can result 
in duplicative or overlapping requirements or lead to opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Some 
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Derivatives: New Rules, New Actors, New Risks, Banque de France, Financial Stability Review, No. 17, April 2013, 15 
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authorities note that this, in turn, could result in market fragmentation and decreased liquidity. In 
addition, some emerging market and developing economies have indicated that challenges may be 
presented by the potential cross-border impact of reforms, such as meeting 
recognition/equivalence requirements of major financial centres in OTC derivatives.”
58
 
This summary nicely captures the mix of issues currently at play and also provides a road map for the 
rest of this article.
59
  
The differing scope of rulebooks causes various compatibility issues. For example, a standard scenario 
is that one jurisdiction requires mandatory clearing of a certain OTC derivatives transactions through a 
CCP and/or the execution of that trade on a regulated market while the other jurisdiction leaves the 
choice to the markets.
60
 Also personal scopes of regulations can differ: EMIR for instance generally 
exempts intra-group trades from the clearing requirement
61
 in addition to which occupational pension 
providers are generally exempted, which is not the case in the US. EU rules more generally apply as a 
rule in a similar fashion to both financial and certain non-financial counterparties, whereas in the US 
the scope more limited.
62
 Inconsistencies can arise also in the context of inconsistent trade reporting 
requirements.
63
 
Direct regulatory conflicts represent the most challenging kind of coordination problems. They arise 
when one jurisdiction’s rules cannot be followed without breaching the requirements of another.64 
Margin requirements offer a prominent example: the rules do not only deal with posting the required 
amount of margin (which could be agreed as meeting the regulatory standard, whichever is the 
highest), but they can set conflicting requirements with respect to division between initial and variable 
margins, eligible classes of collateral, as well as segregation of collateral.
65
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Divergence is a product of many factors. The implementation processes are not synchronized and they 
must navigate through multiple stages and levels also nationally and regionally.
66
 Moreover, different 
political systems and regulatory cultures produce diverse outcomes, ranging from detailed rules-based 
approaches to flexible principles-based approaches. This has been true for OTC derivatives reforms as 
well.
67
 Detailed rule-based systems can be difficult to combine with more flexible, principles-based 
approaches. On the other hand, very detailed rule-based systems are particularly prone to creating 
jurisdictional conflicts and inconsistencies, as evidenced by the US-EU negotiations. Lack of credible 
commitment can also produce divergence. In the absence of binding international agreements and 
organisations enforcing them, international soft law commitments are vulnerable to political 
reconsiderations and compromises. Though regulators can officially adopt the agreed common 
standards, they can also under-enforce or ignore them in the practice of supervision.
68
 The 
commitment can also simply be missing. For instance, not every important market is located in G20 
jurisdictions (e.g. Singapore). Finally, even if regulatory agencies would have the appropriate 
incentives and means to cooperate and coordinate the reforms, their legislative mandates can be 
ambiguous, incompatible and often even shared with other national regulators, imposing coordination 
needs also nationally.
69
 
The Regulate Thy Neighbour approach 
The coordination and implementation problems are made all the more challenging by the fact that the 
lawmakers, especially in the U.S. and EU, have sought to apply their rules extraterritorially in order to 
curb regulatory arbitrage and protect their market share. For instance, the EMIR generally applies to 
contracts entered into between non-EU entities where those contracts would have a direct, substantial, 
and foreseeable effect in the EU or if it were necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of any its 
provisions.
70
 The EU’s approach to extraterritoriality was adopted apparently in response to the 
aggressive stance of the U.S. as evidenced by the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) and its interpretation by the 
US regulators.
71
 The DFA in the U.S. provides that the provisions on derivatives (the DFA uses the 
term “swap”) will apply to activities outside the United States that either (i) have a direct and 
significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States or that (ii) such 
activities contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission may prescribe or promulgate as are 
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necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of any provision of the DFA
72
 The extraterritorial 
application of DFA has been further defined in various SEC and CFTC rules and guidance 
documents.
73
  
Realising the accumulation of grave implementation problems, and market fragmentation risks, the 
FSB has recurrently urged regulators to (a) identify the cross-border application of rules to 
infrastructure, market participants, and products; (b) identify concrete examples of any overlaps, 
inconsistencies and conflicts; and (c) develop options for addressing these issues.
74
 Perhaps most 
importantly, the G20 declared in 2013 that “jurisdictions and regulators should be able to defer to each 
other when it is justified by the quality of their respective regulatory and enforcement regimes, based 
on similar outcomes, in a non-discriminatory way, paying due respect to home country regulation 
regimes”.75  
Both the EU and U.S. have introduced a regulatory framework for allowing deference. The EU 
Commission, assisted by ESMA, may adopt implementing acts declaring that the legal, supervisory 
and enforcement arrangements of a third country are equivalent to the requirements laid down in 
EMIR (Art. 13(2)). Upon such determination, market participants can comply with EU requirements 
by being compliant with the requirements of their own non-EU jurisdiction “where at least one of the 
counterparties is established in that third country”(Art. 13(3) of the EMIR). Upon such equivalence 
decision, ESMA can formally recognise a third-country CCP or a third-country Trade Repository and 
authorise them to provide services in the EU area. ESMA may not recognise a CCP or a trade 
repository unless and before the Commission adopts an implementing act determining that the legal 
and supervisory arrangements of the third country where the CCP is established are equivalent, and 
that the CCPs and Trade Repositories in that country are subject to effective supervision and 
enforcement procedures.
76
 If circumstances change, ESMA can withdraw the recognition, or the 
Commission review its equivalence decision. An interesting question, especially in light of the ECJ’s 
recent Safe harbour decision
77
, is whether and to what extent a national competent authority of an EU 
Member State in exercising its prudential supervisory mandate would have the power to assess the 
adequacy of a third country’s regulatory framework in an individual case. In any case, the ECJ 
undoubtedly has the power to review the validity of the Commission’s equivalence decisions.78 
ESMA’s equivalence assessments, preceding the actual adoption of the Commission decision, are 
based on an objective-based approach, in which the capability of the third country regime to meet the 
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EU’s regulatory objectives is assessed from “a holistic perspective”.79  In practice, however, the 
assessment is preceded by a detailed line-by-line comparison exercise. The European Commission has 
so far adopted nine equivalence decisions with respect to the regulatory regimes for CCPs of nine 
countries.
80
 On the basis of these equivalence decisions ESMA has recognised eleven third-country 
CCPs from four different jurisdictions, thus allowing these CCPs to provide clearing services in the 
EU. Crucially, none of these CCPs are from the U.S. as the Commission has not adopted a decision on 
the equivalence of the U.S. derivatives regime. 
Much like in the EU, the extraterritorial effect of U.S. regulation can be lifted in the framework of 
substituted compliance. In its original form substituted compliance was designed to open up the 
possibility for foreign actors wishing to conduct business in the US to avoid burdensome and 
duplicative SEC registration requirements and certain other U.S. rules.
81
 The more recent “second-
generation” substituted compliance framework is designed more with a view to limiting the 
extraterritorial application of the Dodd–Frank Act.82 Under the substituted compliance regime, certain 
offshore persons and entities that might come under the scope of U.S. rules can instead comply with 
regulations in their home jurisdictions. 
In December 2013 the CFTC issued a series of comparability determinations covering the EU, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong and Switzerland and making favourable determinations in 
favour of all six – nevertheless only with respect to so-called “entity-level” requirements. As to 
“transaction-level” requirements, the E.U. and Japan were deemed comparable only in limited cases 
and clearing and trade execution rules were excluded from the scope altogether.
83
 The idea behind the 
distinction between “entity-level” and “transaction-level” rules is to simplify the cross-border 
application of the DFA’s swap provisions. Entity-level rules are rules that apply to firms as a whole 
whereas transaction-level rules include the rules that apply to the individual transactions or trading.
84
 
The categorization exercise has proven complex and controversial. Moreover, the CFTC’s approach 
has not been entirely consistent with that of the SEC. 
The development of the derivatives rules by the CFTC and SEC respectively, and the related 
complexities and uncertainties, have been well documented and need not be dealt with in detail here.
85
 
In the simplest of terms, the present U.S. substituted compliance paradigm can be described in the 
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following way: “Unless expressly permitted otherwise, you must comply with our rules even if you 
trade elsewhere in the world.”86 
The conclude, the above described conditional deference strategies, such as the US substituted 
compliance and the EU equivalence regime should be regarded as carrots, which are applied together 
with the stick of extraterritorial application of rules as well as the implicit and explicit forms of 
protectionism. In the following, these unilateral strategies are called the Regulate Thy Neighbour 
approach. 
The Transatlantic derivatives dispute 
Given that the U.S. and EU together dominate the global derivatives market and a lot of the trades take 
place across the Atlantic, there is a clear need to cooperate and coordinate the reforms. The parties 
released in 2013 the so-called Path Forward statement, laying down a road map towards mutual 
recognition of derivatives rules.
87
 The deal outlined a package of measures for approaching common 
issues with cross-border derivatives. According to the statement the parties would not seek to apply 
their rules “unreasonably” in the other jurisdiction, but rather “rely on the application and enforcement 
of the rules by the other jurisdiction.” 
Since the Path Forward statement the talks have been continuing in different fora, both official and 
unofficial. Participants have held two meetings in the context of a “Financial Markets Regulatory 
Dialogue” (on July 8, 2014 and January 12, 2015). The purpose of these meetings has been to 
exchange information on regulatory developments as part of on-going dialogue, and discuss shared 
interests in implementation and enforcement of financial regulatory standards.
88
  
However, despite comforting declarations, the deal is yet to be made and the negotiations appear to be 
locked in stalemate.
89
 The range of transatlantic negotiation issues has been detailed in the ESMA 
final technical advice regarding the US regulatory framework, provided to the Commission already in 
September 2013. The outstanding issues were numerous.
90
 With regard to the implementation and 
execution of the clearing obligation, ESMA recognised that the EU and US regimes are broadly 
comparable in their principles and objectives but that there are differences in the respective scopes of 
the regimes, both with regard to entities and especially contracts subject to the obligation.
91
 
In particular, ESMA made a number of reservations about the US third country CCP regime. Perhaps 
most importantly, the US authorities require in practice that all third country CCPs become subject to 
the direct jurisdiction of the US authorities.
92
 In a more a recent comment, ESMA noted the drawback 
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of the European approach to CCP recognition, which is “extremely open” and relies fully on third 
country rules and supervisory arrangements.
93
 This is an anomaly in international comparison as most 
regulators scrutinize systemically relevant infrastructures much more closely. While the EU approach 
presents a “model in terms of mutual reliance” this legislative choice has clearly made the transatlantic 
bargaining more difficult. ESMA encouraged rethinking of the full reliance approach.
94
 
A number of difficult issues thus remain unsolved. At the centre of the current debate is the reluctance 
of ESMA and the EU Commission to declare the US regime for CCPs equivalent. One particularly 
difficult disagreement concerns the methodologies and approaches on CCPs’ margining systems.95 
The failure to reach the agreement could significantly reduce cross-border derivatives activity between 
the EU and US, primarily because trading at home would be much cheaper than abroad. The EU 
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) sets higher capital requirements for those transactions that are 
cleared through a “non-qualified” (i.e. non-authorised or non-recognised) CCP to offset the higher 
risk.
96
 For the moment, EU banks continue to operate under “normal” lower capital requirements with 
regard to non-EU CCPs (including the U.S.) but this is only because under the present transitional 
regime the full effect of certain EMIR rules is regularly postponed. The US regulators have similarly 
postponed the application of various rules by issuing, e.g. targeted “no action letters”.97 
According to the latest reports, the parties are getting closer to agreement and the final deal is expected 
before a set of EU rules become effective on summer 2016. The deal, as it is envisaged, would involve 
both parties making concessions in terms of formal amendments in rules concerning CCP margining 
systems.
98
 
Problems with the Regulate Thy Neighbour approach 
Coordination costs, domestic agency fragmentation, and incompatible mandates  
Deference strategies represent an important exception to the modus operandi of international financial 
regulation where “each state prefers to address cross-border challenges simply by applying its own 
laws”.99 But deference strategies also face numerous drawbacks. One is “the complexity of vetting 
foreign regulatory structures and devising mechanisms for ensuring that foreign supervision applies 
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effectively and consistently to cross-border transactions.”100 ESMA’s technical advice about the 
equivalence of the U.S. regime serves as a good example of what kind of measures the approach 
entails. The advice includes a line-by-line assessment table consisting of more than 200 pages, 
followed by more than 1000 footnotes. The resource constraints have been noted.
101
 ESMA has itself 
made similar remarks: 
“The process for the recognition of [a third country, TC] CCP is extremely rigid and burdensome, 
as demonstrated by the limited number of recognition decisions taken so far. The equivalence 
decision process is taking much more time than expected. - This puts at risk European clearing 
members and their subsidiaries clearing with these TC-CCPs and creates the potential for 
regulatory arbitrage between European and third country CCPs.”
102
 
Critical voices have been raised also in the US. One CFTC commissioner, in her dissenting opinion to 
the final rules on the international application of standards, stated that “the Commission has embarked 
on a cross-border analysis that I fear is taking us down a path of regulatory detail that is overly 
burdensome, complicated, and unnecessary.”103 
The second problem is domestic agency fragmentation, which can weaken the effectiveness of 
international cooperation. In the U.S. the competence in the field of derivatives is shared between the 
SEC and the CFTC. The CFTC is the primary regulator for swaps while the SEC regulates security-
based swaps (mixed swaps are regulated jointly). In its final equivalence assessment, ESMA 
recognised the challenges related to the fact that the implementation of derivatives rules was not 
synchronized between the CFTC and SEC.
104
 Research indicates that coordination tools can 
effectively mitigate agency conflicts in such “shared regulatory spaces” which are created by 
“overlapping, fragmented, and duplicative delegations”.105 This undermines the popular case for 
consolidating agencies under one roof as a merger might simply “convert an interagency coordination 
problem into an intra-agency problem”.106 However, multiple and overlapping delegations make it 
challenging to speak with one voice in cross-border negotiations. The more national regulators need to 
share their regulatory space also internationally, the case for consolidation should to become stronger, 
not least because there is a limited number of coordination tools available in the international 
sphere.
107
 Brummer has also noted: “domestic divergence or fragmentation can create challenges with 
regard to promoting a unified “US position” across a variety of different sectors.”108 
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The third problem concerns legislative mandates and coordination lag. In the present case there 
seemed to have been little coordination efforts before the derivatives legislation was tabled, thus the 
task was left for the executive function. But when legislators incorporate into a legislative act the 
possibility to defer to a foreign jurisdiction on the condition of adequate substantive equivalence or 
comparability of rules and supervisory practices, they also authorise the regulators in charge of the 
implementation to engage, within the limits of their legislative mandate, in cross-border negotiations 
on the final content of the rulebook. A regulator’s bargaining power is constrained by the legal 
authority delegated to it. The problem here is that while a broad mandates would likely make reaching 
the agreement easier, the amount of bargaining power and discretion delegated to the executive organs 
correlates inversely with such values as legitimacy and democracy. In any case, for the horizontal 
network model to work, ambitious global projects such as the OTC derivatives reform should be better 
coordinated already when legislation is being drafted. Tellingly, the transatlantic negotiations on the 
mutual recognition of derivatives rules seem to have reached a conclusion that issues need to be taken 
back to the legislator.
109
 
Regulatory arbitrage, rigidity, and market fragmentation 
The general problem with deference and recognition strategies such as substituted compliance is 
regulatory arbitrage. Unilateral export of regulatory standards works best in policy areas where 
regulated targets are relatively “inelastic”.110 Financial markets are very elastic and the competitive 
pressures that apply in the market for financial derivatives regulation are well known.
111
 If foreign 
jurisdictions are recognised without adequate convergence, firms and transactions can start moving to 
friendlier jurisdictions.
112
 In short, regulatory arbitrage reduces costs or captures profit opportunities 
that are created by different regulations or laws.
113
 Like all mandatory rules regulating the private 
domain, the expansion of regulatory space in the area financial derivatives limits autonomy and 
choice, but the fact that the governance system is still built on the principle of regulatory sovereignty 
and territoriality
114
 means that regulators can only limit choice within their sovereign regulatory space 
(even if this regulatory space might transcend jurisdictional borders). Those subject to rules might no 
longer have the freedom to choose certain economic terms of their contracts, but as a second-best 
option they can choose the regulatory regime providing the best terms. 
Regulatory arbitrage and negative regulatory competition can undermine public policy goals. One way 
to look at this familiar problem is assessing it against the Financial Trilemma, which indicates that (1) 
financial stability, (2) cross-border financial integration and (3) national financial policies are 
                                                     
109
 See section 3.3. above and Stafford and Brunsden, EU and US close in on derivatives oversight agreement, The Financial 
Times (FT.com, FT Trading Room), January 14, 2016. 
110
 Bradford, Anu. “The Brussels Effect.” Nw. UL Rev. 107 (2012): 1. “Strict domestic regulations can operate as global 
standards only if such strict regulations cannot be circumvented by moving the regulatory targets to another jurisdiction” 
Ibid., 16. 
111
 See e.g. Griffith, op. cit., 1293 (“In the context of derivatives, if U.S. authorities impose a harsh clearing regime, banks 
may shift their derivatives operations to London or, if European and American regulation converge, to Hong Kong or 
Singapore or some less highly regulated jurisdiction.”) 
112
 Jackson, op.cit. See also Coffee, op.cit. 
113
 Partnoy, Frank. “Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage”, 22J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997). 
(“Regulation that imposes costs on non-derivatives transactions creates an incentive for parties to structure economically 
equivalent derivatives transactions that avoid the reach of the regulation or reduce its cost”. Ibid.) See also Riles, op. cit., 
63, 65. 
114
 On the prevalence of territoriality as a central element in international financial law, see C. Brummer. "Territoriality as a 
Regulatory Technique: Notes from the Financial Crisis." University of Cincinnati Law Review 79 (2010): 11-16.  
Heikki Marjosola 
18 
incompatible objectives.
115
 The negative effects of regulatory arbitrage, i.e. the weakening of the 
effectiveness of regulatory measures, is a direct consequence of not giving the other two objectives, 
that is, national financial policies (broadly, sovereignty
116
) and financial integration, which allows 
capital to move (relatively) freely. 
The accepted wisdom to counter the problem of regulatory arbitrage is harmonisation. This strategy 
has been put sternly into practice in the European Union with the “single rulebook” harmonisation 
agenda, backed by the empowerment of new authorities to implement the single set of rules. A 
common set of rules, or rulebooks without material differences, would effectively eliminate arbitrage 
opportunities. Also internationally arbitrage problems would not exist if everybody simply agreed on 
everything but the limits of this strategy are as obvious as the benefits of it successful completion: 
“Like Holy Grail, international consensus is more sought than discovered”.117 The obstacles to 
harmonization are numerous.
118
 
If harmonisation is unfeasible, regulatory arbitrage concerns (which also include the risk of losing 
business and jobs) need to be addressed by other means. For now it seems that states might be more 
willing to give up on financial integration rather than building more global governance structures. 
There is abundant evidence of the on-going disruption and fragmentation especially in the transatlantic 
trading relationship.
119
 Artomonov concludes that “the global derivatives market is not global 
anymore; rather, it has become a fragmented system of ring-fenced liquidity pools, where risk is 
concentrated rather than being dispersed evenly throughout the global system.”120  
Regulation can promote de-globalisation in various ways. The EU for instance applies direct 
restrictions on cross-border provision of financial services into the jurisdiction as well as 
precautionary capital charges for the EU entities when they use the services of certain third country 
entities. The DFA grants the CFTC and SEC the authority to prohibit an entity domiciled in a foreign 
country from participating in the United States in derivatives transactions, if either authority considers 
that the regulation of derivatives in that foreign country undermines the stability of the United States 
financial system (Section 715 of the DFA). 
The on-going fragmentation is giving way to what could be called a “titanic-model” of systemic risk 
management, which mitigates risk by isolating it in what are assumed to be watertight compartments 
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of national jurisdictions. One model suggests that this might actually not be such a bad idea if the 
focus is solely on financial stability.
121
 But theory also suggests that risk is better managed when it is 
not concentrated and markets are more liquid. More global financial markets can do more good than 
harm, e.g. in terms of increased liquidity, better means of risk diversification and more means of 
financing beneficial innovation - insofar as we manage to regulate away the stability risks. And 
perhaps most importantly, financial fragmentation is a clear indication of the failure the global 
derivatives reform. Why bother to agree on a global reform agenda in the first place if the result is a 
retreat to territorialism and protectionism? 
Which way forward? 
Bilateral regulatory export through a transatlantic deal? 
Transgovernmental networks can promote convergence without Treaties and centralization through 
“the export of regulatory rules and practices from major powers to weaker states”.122 In this way 
territorialism indeed “matches legal authority to market power”123, meaning, in the context of financial 
markets, simply that “the bigger the capital market, the greater the influence of regulators.”124 In such 
a view, the transatlantic derivatives dispute does not come as a surprise. The power asymmetry 
between the Atlantic neighbours has been in steady decline. One reason for this has been the 
institutional evolution and the centralization of regulatory authority within the EU.
125
 
On the other hand, also the globalization of finance and tightening competition from both old and 
emerging financial centres has shaken the status quo.
126
 The importance of the U.S. and the EU as the 
primary locus of global capital markets activity has declined as a result of the financial crisis with 
diminishing cross-border capital flows,
127
 as well as “the rise of the rest”, i.e. the emerging multipolar 
word of financial regulation.
128
 One might therefore reasonably enquire what in fact are the advantages 
of bilateral, transatlantic cooperation. Should we not rather acknowledge the zero-sum nature of the 
“market for financial regulation” and the elasticity of capital, and accordingly focus less on exclusive 
clubs of regulators and more on building open multilateral cooperation forums?  
Many have nevertheless proposed building a deeper cooperative relationship between the U.S. and EU 
instead of relying on global approaches. First of all, the U.S. and EU together still account for roughly 
90 per cent of the market for derivatives.
129
According to Pan, the benefits of deeper cooperation stem 
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from general mutual understanding and familiarity as well as a degree of commonality with respect to 
regulatory interests and philosophies.
130
 Coffee also proposes a more exclusive approach where the 
U.S. and the EU would take the lead. Rather than stand still and wait for the unlikely international 
consensus to emerge, a deeper transatlantic coordination would force other important jurisdictions to 
converge towards the high-quality US-EU standards.
131
 Game theoretic assessments further support 
the hypothesis that coordination between great powers can effectively promote convergence.
132
 In 
short, though the Regulate Thy Neighbour approach seems not to work well among equals, through 
cooperation between the equal powers the strategy’s essence could be revived. 
The EU and US have indeed recognized the need for deeper cooperation as well as the chance for joint 
leadership: “by coordinating our efforts, we are providing a model for other regulators and 
jurisdictions working to implement their G20 commitments.”133  
The case for mutual recognition and multilateralism 
At present international standards play little role when it comes to the most important cross-border 
issues. Even though the G20 jurisdictions demand that for instance their CCPs comply with the CPSS-
IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures (known as PFMIs) the international principles 
do not provide any kind of minimum standard for the purposes of mutual recognition. Therefore, in 
principle all the additional requirements imposed for instance by EMIR on CCPs need to be adopted in 
foreign jurisdictions should they wish their CCPs to be able to offer services for European clients (or 
their offshore branches). The third country CCPs cannot voluntarily opt-in to more stringent EMIR 
standards either.
134
 An interesting outcome of such a regime is that this could increase private demand 
for more stringent regulation, thus causing privately initiated racing to the most stringent (and 
powerful) regulatory regimes.
135
 
The transatlantic partnership has the promise of fostering convergence and thus mitigating the threat of 
regulatory arbitrage. But the problems of the Regulate Thy Neighbour strategy (see Section 4) will not 
be solved simply by turning a unilateral strategy into a bilateral one. In certain respects the problems 
could become even worse. Joint leadership, at least an active one, would only increase the 
coordination demands between the Atlantic partners. 
There might be more fundamental problems still. An increasing number of academics point out that 
simply having and applying the same rules everywhere might not secure the reaching of a more stable 
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financial system.
136
 According to one (rather theoretical) view a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach could 
actually introduce structural weakness into the system and increase systemic fragility.
137
 On the basis 
of such views, the present generation of substituted compliance in the U.S. has also been criticized for 
its general hostility towards experimentation and diversity.
138
 
The problem with policy prescriptions relating to harmonisation and regulatory arbitrage is the 
analytical difficulty of distinguishing bad regulatory competition from more beneficial forms of 
competition and innovation. When regulators share similar objectives and functions, regulatory 
competition can create positive experimentation.
139
 The positive dimensions of regulatory pluralism 
should not be neglected.
140
 Moreover, categorical arguments against harmonisation and the associated 
rigidity risks at times neglect the difference between minimum harmonisation, comprising the 
adoption of common minimum standards in order to prevent regulatory race to the bottom, and rigid 
maximum harmonisation which details the same rules for everybody and prohibits the adoption of 
stricter rules. 
In the global market for derivatives, the first step towards mutual recognition would be to further 
increase the normativity of international expert standards and benchmarks such as CPMI-IOSCO 
Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs). In the shadow of unilateralism, much 
important work is being done in multilateral standardisation bodies.
141
 BCBS–IOSCO have also 
adopted joint standards for margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives.
142
 These 
principles are gradually being integrated in unilateral comparability assessments, but the second, and 
much bigger, step would be to hand the task of making equivalence or comparability assessments to an 
objective international body.
143
  
Some academics have envisioned “managed” mutual recognition schemes (i.e. based on bilateral 
formal mutual recognition agreements) without a “global government.” Such mutual recognition 
regimes have been seen as an important part of global administrative law regimes, representing “a 
coordinated approach to the regulation of global market processes among diverse jurisdictions”.144 But 
formalisation of bilateral mutual recognition schemes would seem to be an unnecessary step towards 
workable forms global financial governance, considering especially the resource-incentive nature of 
continuous comparability assessments as well as the general agility and elasticity of financial markets 
(adding to the incompleteness of sovereign contracts as well as to the costs of contracting). It is 
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probably because of the latter reason why international finance, unlike trade, has resisted more 
formalised forms of international governance in the first place.
145
 
There seems to be an emerging consensus that effective governance of financial markets requires the 
pooling of some degree of sovereignty on the supra-state level.
146
 Cases have even been made for 
either a new treaty-based international financial organisation
147
, or for channelling the global reforms 
through the existing international structures such as the WTO.
148
 The coordination problems and 
protectionist pressures provide strong support for this case. IOSCO’s track record in promulgating 
widely accepted principles and multilateral cooperation devices especially in the area of enforcement 
cooperation, would make it the most indicate international body for receiving more formal powers and 
responsibilities in settling international coordination issues.
149
 A recent proposal argues for 
strengthening the role of the FSB.
150
 But despite its increasing importance and the emergence of 
organizational hierarchies, the decisions of the FSB continue to be non-binding on its members, and its 
operative powers remain limited to “moral suasion and peer pressure”.151 The crisis momentum did not 
lead to multilateral treaty negotiations and the governance regime for international finance remains 
soft at its core.
152
 
Conclusions 
The big question behind this article could be formulated as follows: can we coordinate our way around 
the Financial Trilemma in the absence of hard-law based international or supranational structures? 
Recall that the Trilemma posits that only two of the three objectives of financial stability, national 
financial policies and financial integration can be achieved. Can bilateral coordination measures bring 
about enough convergence so that borders for capital can be kept open without at the same time 
enabling regulatory arbitrage and race-to-the-bottom competition, which would eventually dilute the 
objective of financial stability? Or do we have to give up instead on globalisation and market 
integration and let the present tendency of market fragmentation and new protectionism foster? 
The prolonged dispute between the US and EU seems to present a case against the possible benefits of 
coordination-driven transgovernmentalism. The regulatory turf war is all the more disconcerting given 
that the communication channels and early forms of collaboration between the Atlantic neighbours 
were established already more than ten years ago. During 2004-2007 the Committee of European 
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